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Facing
History
DANIEL J. MAHONEY

It Was a Long Time Ago, and It Never Happened
Anyway: Russia and the Communist Past,
by David Satter (Yale, 383 pp., $29.95)

D

AVID SATTeR has written two
books that uneasily coexist
under the same cover. The
first is a welcome, if inadequately balanced, account of the failure
of post-Communist Russia to come to
terms sufficiently with the Communist
past. The second is a scorching critique of
“the Russian political tradition” for failing to acknowledge the “absolute value”
of the individual and for privileging the
various projects of the state above the
human beings that it governs. Satter
pleads for Russians to acknowledge their
guilt for tolerating and participating in
the violence and mendacity of the totalitarian state. He rightly calls on Russians
“to face the full truth about Communism”
and to stop insisting that the scale of its
crimes have been exaggerated or that
they somehow “were a product of necessity in a unique historical situation.” But
at the same time, Satter deeply roots the
Soviet experiment in historic Russia. He
ultimately sees Soviet Communism as a
byproduct of an older Russian political
tradition, one responsible both for the
crimes of Communism and for the failure
of post-Communist Russia to acknowledge adequately the criminal character of
the Communist state.

Mr. Mahoney holds the Augustine Chair in
Distinguished Scholarship at Assumption College in
Worcester, Mass. He is the author of Aleksandr
Solzhenitsyn: The Ascent from Ideology and
a co-editor of The Solzhenitsyn Reader.

For Satter, Russia’s only hope lies in a
self-conscious break with its national
traditions, since “the state tradition is
what tsarism, the Soviet regime, and
contemporary Russia have in common.”
He thus sides with those such as Tibor
Szamuely and Richard Pipes, who blame
Communism on an essentially slavish
Russian soul and on a state tradition that
is said to have no place for moderation
or respect for the individual. There are
many problems with this position, starting with the fact that it cannot account
for the thoroughgoing Communist assault on the memory and traditions of
historic Russia.
The book has considerable strengths.
It does a brilliant job of chronicling the
human consequences of Communism:
the millions who died during the Red
Terror and the famine and dekulakization of the Thirties, and the savagery of
the Gulag. Like the best students of totalitarianism, Satter knows that human
beings suffered as much from mendacity,
from “forced participation in the lie,” as
from the brutalization of their bodies.
It is heart-rending to read his accounts
of the efforts of those associated with
Memorial (the most active of Russian
groups attempting to pay tribute to the
victims of Communism) to find and document mass graves, even as some of their
compatriots look back nostalgically on the
Soviet regime. Satter ably documents the
tug-of-war between the anti-totalitarian
convictions of the best Russians and the
slow drive to normalize the Soviet past.
One fascinating chapter discusses the
(ultimately) failed effort to restore the
statue of Dzerzhinsky, the father of the
Soviet secret police, to a place of honor
in Moscow.
Satter also intelligently grapples with
the continuing “appeal of Communism.”
He shows how Russian patriotism is
conflated with “Great Soviet patriotism” and the cult of World War II,
while he rightly notes that the USSR
won the war despite the terroristic character of the Stalinist regime. In addition, many people look back longingly
to the “equality in servitude” that characterized the final post-Stalinist period
of Communist rule. Satter acknowledges that the growing loss of interest in
memorializing the victims of Communism, and the accompanying nostalgia
for the Soviet past, has a great deal to do
with the calamitous condition of Russia

in the 1990s. During the Yeltsin period,
lauded as “democratic” throughout the
Western world, “cogs” of the old Soviet
machine presided over “the largest
transfer of property in history without
the benefit of rule of law.”
Satter’s treatment of the various
efforts to remember the crimes of Communism is nearly exhaustive. He shows
how the efforts of Memorial and other
Russian groups and individuals committed to an anti-totalitarian ethos, and to
the recovery of national memory, have
largely been met by indifference or hostility. But he overstates his case. For
example, he faults the role of the Russian
Orthodox Church in paying tribute to
the thousands who perished under Communism. This has become a major part of
the pastoral life of the Church, with
February 7 now being commemorated
annually as the “day of the new martyrs.”
Satter believes this and other church
observances allow the state to get away
with its own inadequate response to the
historic crimes. But surely the Church
deserves more credit for its efforts to
honor the dead and to highlight the evils
of totalitarianism.
Satter also says nothing about the television programs that in recent years have
brought the truth about Communism
to millions of Russian viewers. Russian
state television has shown serializations
of Shalamov’s Kolyma Tales and Solzhenitsyn’s In the First Circle—outstanding productions that left out
nothing essential. Surely a book that
aims to provide a comprehensive account of contemporary Russia’s relationship to the Communist past is
obliged to acknowledge these positive
developments. Nor does Satter say anything about the numerous comments by
President Dmitri Medvedev about the
need for Russia to forthrightly confront
its history of oppression (he has been
much more insistent on this point than
Vladimir Putin). My point is not to deny
that Russia’s coming to terms with the
Communist past has been halting, incomplete, and finally inadequate. It is
simply to say that the record is considerably more complicated than Satter indicates.
One more example. Satter is absolutely right to criticize a new history textbook, written by Alexander Filippov,
that was introduced into some Russian
schools in 2008. That textbook praises
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Stalin as “the most successful leader of
the Soviet Union” and a man who was
indispensable for both industrialization
and victory in war. The textbook tepidly
condemns terror, even as it relativizes it.
But surely Satter ought also to have
mentioned that a 500-page abridgement
of Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag Archipelago,
scrupulously prepared by Solzhenitsyn’s
widow, was introduced to Russian
schools in 2010. The Gulag Archipelago
is the most powerful indictment of the
crimes of Communism ever written,
even though it is much more than this.
The book joins two other works of Solzhenitsyn, One Day in the Life of Ivan
Denisovich and Matryona’s Home, as
required reading in Russian schools.
That is a sign of hope.
This silence about the new edition of
Gulag is probably connected to Satter’s
fundamental ambivalence about Sol zhenitsyn. he admits that Solzhenitsyn
did more than anyone else to tell the
truth about Communism and to undermine the legitimacy of the Soviet regime.
But he insists that Solzhenitsyn does not
believe in “universal values” and that he
only “objected to political persecution
when it was done for the wrong reasons.”
When Solzhenitsyn makes the perfectly
sensible argument that human rights
need to be balanced by a concern for
human obligations, this is seen as evidence of his allegedly authoritarian inclinations. Satter confuses Solzhenitsyn’s
argument that Russians were victims
par excellence of the Soviet regime
with the absolutely false claim that he
believes Russians have little to repent
for.
It was in fact Solzhenitsyn who first
raised the call for public penitence for
Communism, in his great 1973 essay
“Repentance and Self-Limitation as
Categories in the Life of Nations.” he
repeated the call for personal and national repentance in the speeches he delivered to his compatriots in 1994, upon his
return home from 20 years of forced
exile in the West. At the University of
Saratov in 1995, he spoke eloquently and
forcefully about the poisoned atmosphere of a Russia that saw the unrepentant continue to hold high positions. And
he called for everyone to repent: Perhaps
“only 10 percent actually participated in
the repressive apparatus,” but the other
90 percent too often passed by injustices
and “watched human beings trampled
46
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underfoot, and said nothing to save them
and their families.”
One cannot quarrel with Satter’s claim
that “Russia needs to end the imbalance
between the status of the individual and
the prerogatives of the state.” My quarrel
is with his tendency to blame Com munism exclusively on a state tradition to
which in truth it was alien, and his concomitant tendency to simplify the Russia
that existed before 1917 as well as the one
that was restored to life after 1991. The
Russian state tradition is far more diverse
than Satter suggests. It saw the development of a vibrant civil society after 1860
and the strengthening of constitutionalism
in the years after 1905. Pyotr Stolypin,
prime minister from 1906 to 1911 and one
of the great statesmen of the modern period, precisely wanted to create citizen proprietors who were both independent of the
state and the best guarantee of its stability.
It was this possibility of a strong but free
state that Bolshevism destroyed in the
years after 1917. It attacked the pillars
of the Russian old regime—the Church,
the independent peasantry, and the intelligentsia—with a fury that was the
hallmark of totalitarianism in the 20th
century. Like many in the West, Satter
looks to the provisional government of
1917 as an inspiration for “restarting” the
Russian political tradition. But these
rather pathetic “democrats” were incapable of standing up to the totalitarians to
their left and quickly ceded power to
Lenin and his Bolshevik party. They did
not bring freedom to Russia, but anarchy
and indecision that paved the way for the
coming of totalitarianism.
Russia must indeed learn to “value the
people it has.” And for its moral health it
must condemn the Communist regime
that so recklessly disregarded the lives
and liberties of its people. But it is a
terrible simplification to blame Com munism on a national and political tradition that it set out to eradicate. And
Russians surely must have pride in the
best of their traditions, which are not
coextensive with either Communism or
“oriental despotism.” But these misgivings aside, Satter has written a thoughtprovoking book that does much to
illumine the nature of the totalitarian
experience in the 20th century, as well as
the pressing need for Russians to come
to terms with it if they are to have a
future worthy of a great people and
nation.

Evident
Truths
JOE CARTER

The Case for Polarized Politics: Why America
Needs Social Conservatism, by Jeffrey Bell
(Encounter, 296 pp., $25.95)

‘F

AITh is a very, very important part of my life,” said
Rick Santorum in a recent
Republican presidential
debate in Florida, “but it’s a very, very
important part of this country. The
foundational documents of our country—everybody talks about the Constitution, very, very important. But the
Constitution is the ‘how’ of America.
It’s the operator’s manual. The ‘why’ of
America, who we are as a people, is in
the Declaration of Independence: ‘We
hold these truths to be self-evident, that
all men are created equal and endowed
by their creator with certain unalienable
rights.’”
As Jeffrey Bell claims in his new
book, The Case for Polarized Politics,
most social conservatives believe that
the central principle asserted in the
Declaration of Independence is unde niable. Bell contends that this is what
divides social conservatives from social
liberals: “Most—not all—social conservatives believe the words in that
sentence are literally true. Most—not
all—opponents of social conservatism
do not believe those words are literally
true.”
Social conservatives believe rights
are given by the theistic God (most often
assumed to be the God of the Bible) and
are an irrevocable gift to all humanity,

Mr. Carter is online editor of First Things and a
co-author of How to Argue Like Jesus.
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